Introduction {#Sec1}
============

In many instances, the information produced by one agent is interesting to other agents as well. Think, for example, of firms exploring neighbouring oil patches: if one firm strikes oil, chances are there will be oil in its neighbour's patch as well. Such games of purely informational externalities have been analysed by the strategic bandit literature,[1](#Fn1){ref-type="fn"} which so far has only analysed the case of homogeneous agents. However, in many instances, one of the oil firms, for example, might be a big multinational firm that has access to a superior drilling technology. In this article, we aim to analyse the impact of asymmetries in players' exploration technologies in a game of strategic experimentation with two-armed exponential bandits.

The seminal paper by Keller et al. ([@CR11]) analyses this problem with homogeneous players. In the current paper, we generalise the analysis by introducing asymmetric players, in the sense that their pay-off arrival rates from a good risky arm differ. This implies that, given the risky arm is good, the expected time needed to learn this differs between the players. As actions and outcomes are perfectly publicly observable, and players start out with a common prior, they will always have a common posterior belief. We characterise the set of Markov perfect equilibria with the players' common posterior belief as the state variable for all ranges of asymmetry between the players. If the degree of asymmetry between the players is sufficiently high, there exists an *equilibrium in cut-off strategies*, i.e. where both players use a cut-off strategy. That is, either player uses the risky arm if and only if the likelihood he attributes to the option being good is greater than a certain threshold. This equilibrium is unique in the class of equilibria in cut-off strategies. Whenever only one of the players experiments and the other free rides in this equilibrium, it is always the player with the weaker technology who free rides. In the case of homogeneous players (Keller et al. [@CR11]), by contrast, there never exists an equilibrium in cut-off strategies, and players swap the roles of pioneer and free rider at least once in any equilibrium. In our setting, aggregate pay-offs in the equilibrium in cut-off strategies are higher than in any other equilibrium. If the degree of asymmetry is low, at least one player uses a non-cut-off strategy in any equilibrium. In contrast to the homogeneous case (Keller et al. [@CR11]), we furthermore show that more frequent switches of arms do not unambiguously improve the equilibrium welfare with asymmetric players.

Related literature {#Sec2}
------------------

This paper contributes to the literature on strategic experimentation with bandits, a problem studied quite widely in economics, amongst others, by Bolton and Harris ([@CR3]), Keller et al. ([@CR11]), Keller and Rady ([@CR12]), Klein and Rady ([@CR15]), Klein ([@CR13]) and Thomas ([@CR19]). In all of these papers, players are homogeneous. Except in Thomas ([@CR19]) and Klein and Rady ([@CR15]), players' bandits are of the same type and *free riding* is a common feature in all the above models except for Thomas ([@CR19]). Many variants of this problem have been studied in the literature[2](#Fn2){ref-type="fn"}. Rosenberg et al. ([@CR18]) and Murto and Välimäki ([@CR16]), for instance, assume that switches to the safe arm are irreversible and that experimentation outcomes are private information, while Bonatti and Hörner ([@CR4]) and Heidhues et al. ([@CR8]) investigate the case of private actions. In Dong ([@CR6]), actions and outcomes are public, but one of the players receives an initial private signal. Rosenberg et al. ([@CR17]) analyse the role of the observability of outcomes and the correlation between risky-arm types in a setting in which a switch to the safe arm is irreversible. Besanko and Wu ([@CR2]) use the Keller et al. ([@CR11]) framework to study how an R&D race is impacted by market structure. Das ([@CR5]) analyses an R&D race in a strategic bandit setting in which on the risky arm, players can learn both privately and publicly. Guo ([@CR7]) and Zambrano ([@CR20]) analyse the problem of a principal delegating the operation of a two-armed bandit to an agent; in Klein ([@CR14]), the bandit the agent operates has three arms. Banks et al. ([@CR1]) provide an experimental test of a single-agent two-armed bandit problem; Hoelzemann and Klein ([@CR9]) do so in a strategic setting. The paper closest to the present paper is Keller et al. ([@CR11]), who find that, with homogeneous players, there is never an equilibrium in cut-off strategies. By contrast, we show that, with heterogeneous players, an equilibrium in cut-off strategies may exist and that it is welfare maximising whenever it exists.

The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section [2](#Sec3){ref-type="sec"} sets out the model. Section [3](#Sec4){ref-type="sec"} discusses the social planner's solution. A detailed analysis of equilibria for different ranges of heterogeneity is undertaken in Sect. [4](#Sec5){ref-type="sec"}. Finally, Sect. [5](#Sec11){ref-type="sec"} concludes. Payoff functions are shown in "Appendix A", while some proofs are relegated to "Appendix B".

Two-armed bandit model with heterogeneous players {#Sec3}
=================================================

There are two players (1 and 2), each of whom faces a two-armed bandit in continuous time. One of the arms is safe, in that a player who uses it gets a flow pay-off of $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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The uncertainty in this model arises from the fact that players do not initially know whether their risky arms are good or bad. Players start with a common prior belief $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\{p_t\}_{t\ge 0}$$\end{document}$. As can be seen from the objective function, there are no pay-off externalities between the players. Indeed, the presence of the other player impacts a given player's pay-offs only via the information that he generates, i.e. via the belief.

As mentioned in Introduction, we will focus our analysis on Markov perfect equilibria with the players' common posterior belief as the state variable. Formally, a Markov strategy of player *i* is any left-continuous function $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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As only a good risky arm can yield positive pay-offs in the form of lump sums, the arrival of a lump sum fully reveals the risky arm to be good. Hence, if either player receives a lump sum at a time $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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Planner's problem {#Sec4}
=================

Suppose there is a benevolent social planner, who controls the actions of both players and wants to maximise the sum of their pay-offs. Since the planner's expected pay-off at any point in time only depends on the belief at that time and the belief follows a controlled Markov process, this is a Markov decision problem. Therefore, it is without loss of generality for the planner to restrict himself to Markov strategies $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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Proposition 1 {#FPar1}
-------------
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Proof {#FPar2}
-----

Proof is by a standard verification argument. Please see "Appendix B.1" for details. $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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By the above proposition, the belief at which player 1 switches to the safe arm in the planner's solution is higher than it would be if both players' Poisson arrival rates were equal to $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$\lambda _1=1$$\end{document}$. This is because, as player 2's arrival rate $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$\lambda _2$$\end{document}$ decreases, the benefit from player 1's experimentation decreases.

The planner's solution is depicted in Fig. [1](#Fig1){ref-type="fig"}.[3](#Fn3){ref-type="fn"} The planner's value function is a smooth convex curve which lies in the range \[2*s*, *g*\]. At the belief $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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Non-cooperative game {#Sec5}
====================

We will first analyse a player's best responses to a given Markov strategy of the other player.

Best responses {#Sec6}
--------------
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In the next subsection, we will characterise the condition under which an equilibrium in cut-off strategies exists.

Equilibrium in cut-off strategies {#Sec7}
---------------------------------
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### Lemma 1 {#FPar5}
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In the following proposition, we will show that there exists an equilibrium in cut-off strategies if and only if the degree of asymmetry between the players is high enough.

### Proposition 3 {#FPar7}
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"Appendix B.4" shows that the belief $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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The equilibrium in cut-off strategies is depicted in Fig. [2](#Fig2){ref-type="fig"}[6](#Fn6){ref-type="fn"}. In this equilibrium, both players' pay-offs are equal to *s* for $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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Experimentation decisions are strategic substitutes. Therefore in any equilibrium, at the lowest belief where some experimentation takes place, one *pioneer* is indifferent between choosing the safe and the risky arm, given that the other player is free riding. The *free rider* can determine a threshold belief $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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In Sect. [4.5](#Sec10){ref-type="sec"}, we show that if the players' learning speeds are different while the expected flow pay-off from the good risky arm is the same, there again exists an equilibrium in cut-off strategies if and only if the difference in the learning speeds is high enough. The same qualitative result obtains for identical learning speeds but different expected pay-offs from the good risky arm. Indeed, either form of asymmetry creates differences in the players' free riding incentives. Diagrammatically, this can be seen by a gap between the best response diagonals.

Equilibria in non-cut-off strategies {#Sec8}
------------------------------------

In the previous subsection, we have identified a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of an equilibrium in cut-off strategies. In this subsection, we will analyse equilibria where at least one of the players uses a non-cut-off strategy. To begin with, we show that even for low degrees of asymmetry, there exists an equilibrium where player 2 uses a cut-off strategy.

### Proposition 4 {#FPar9}

There exists an equilibrium in which only player 2 uses a cut-off strategy if and only if $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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### Proof {#FPar10}
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The equilibrium where only player 2 uses a cut-off strategy is depicted in Fig. [3](#Fig3){ref-type="fig"}[9](#Fn9){ref-type="fn"}. The black and the orange curves depict the pay-offs to player 1 and 2, respectively. As the degree of asymmetry between the players is low, $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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Propositions [3](#FPar7){ref-type="sec"} and [4](#FPar9){ref-type="sec"} together imply that there always exists an equilibrium where player 2 uses a cut-off strategy with $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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When the degree of asymmetry is low, there will exist a range of beliefs just above $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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Equilibria where at least one player uses a non-cut-off strategy always exist, as the following proposition shows. The following proposition, together with Proposition [3](#FPar7){ref-type="sec"}, fully characterises the set of all Markov perfect equilibria. To state the proposition, we let $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$v_i$$\end{document}$ be player *i*'s equilibrium pay-off. For both players $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$n\in \{1,2\}$$\end{document}$, we define $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$p_S^n$$\end{document}$ as the (unique) point of intersection of $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$v_n$$\end{document}$ and $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$D_n$$\end{document}$.[12](#Fn12){ref-type="fn"} Let $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$p_S^i=\min \{p_S^1,p_S^2\}$$\end{document}$ and $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$p_S^j = \max \{p_S^1,p_S^2\}$$\end{document}$.

### Proposition 5 {#FPar11}
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### Proof {#FPar12}

That the proposed strategies are mutually best responses immediately follows from our discussion at the top of Sect. [4](#Sec5){ref-type="sec"}. That such equilibria always exist follows immediately from the continuity of players' pay-off functions and the fact that $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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Welfare rankings of equilibria {#Sec9}
------------------------------

As in Keller et al. ([@CR11]), there are two potential sources of inefficiency in our model: players might not produce enough information, and/or they might produce the information too slowly. In order to analyse these different effects, we define the *experimentation intensity* at time $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$t \ge 0$$\end{document}$ as $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$\hat{K}_t = k_{1,t}+ k_{2,t}$$\end{document}$, and the *amount of experimentation* up to time *T* as $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$\int _0^T \hat{K}_t \, \mathrm{d}t$$\end{document}$. Thus, we measure the *output* of players' experimentation efforts, with our measure taking into account that it matters for the information-production process which player invests time in the risky arm. The corresponding concepts in Keller et al. ([@CR11]), by contrast, measure the *input*, i.e. the overall resources spent on producing information. In the case of homogeneous players with productivities $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$1/\lambda $$\end{document}$ times the output, as indicated by our measure. The following result mirrors the finding in Keller et al. ([@CR11]) (see their Lemma 3.1 in conjunction with their Propositions 5.1 and 6.1) that the amount of experimentation is the same in any Markov perfect equilibrium. This implies that the welfare ranking of equilibria is solely determined by the delay in information production.

### Lemma 2 {#FPar13}

Suppose there is no success on the risky arm. Then, the amount of experimentation is the same in any Markov perfect equilibrium.

### Proof {#FPar14}

As we have seen from our characterisation of equilibria, experimentation stops at $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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In the following proposition, we establish that in any equilibrium in which players swap the roles of pioneer and free rider at least once, player 1's (2's) pay-off will hit $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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### Proposition 6 {#FPar15}

Consider any equilibrium described in Proposition [5](#FPar11){ref-type="sec"}. Suppose $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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### Proof {#FPar16}
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In the equilibrium in cut-off strategies, player 2 free rides for all beliefs in $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$ (\bar{p}_1, p_2^{'})$$\end{document}$ where he experiments and player 1 free rides. Thus, for all $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$p \in (\bar{p}_1, p_2^{'}]$$\end{document}$, the equilibrium in cut-off strategies gives the highest pay-off to player 2, as he can free ride on the more productive player's experimentation. This implies that, in the range $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$p \in (\bar{p}_1, p_1^{'}]$$\end{document}$, player 1 experiments in the equilibrium in cut-off strategies and receives his single-agent pay-off. In any other equilibrium, however, there exists some open subset of $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\lambda _2 \in (\frac{s}{h},\lambda _2^{*}]$$\end{document}$. This implies that the equilibrium in cut-off strategies exists. In the following proposition, we show that the equilibrium in cut-off strategies strictly welfare dominates all other equilibria.

### Proposition 7 {#FPar17}
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### Proof {#FPar18}

Please refer to "Appendix (B.7)". $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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First, observe that in the equilibrium in cut-off strategies, both players experiment for beliefs greater than $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$p_S^2 > p_2^{'}$$\end{document}$ (by Proposition [6](#FPar15){ref-type="sec"}), the range of beliefs where both players experiment is largest in the equilibrium in cut-off strategies. Next, in the equilibrium in cut-off strategies, whenever only one player experiments, it is the player with the higher pay-off arrival rate, player 1. In any other equilibrium, however, there is a range of beliefs where player 2 plays the role of the lonely pioneer. Since player 1 is more productive, in any equilibrium all experimentation ceases at $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\bar{p}_1$$\end{document}$, information is most efficiently generated in the equilibrium in cut-off strategies. This intuitively explains the result of Proposition [7](#FPar17){ref-type="sec"}. One can observe that, since, at any belief, the intensity of experimentation is highest in the equilibrium in cut-off strategies, information generation is fastest. Thus, this equilibrium involves least *delay*. As experimentation amounts are the same in all equilibria (Lemma [2](#FPar13){ref-type="sec"}), this implies that the cut-off equilibrium welfare dominates all other equilibria.[13](#Fn13){ref-type="fn"}

The comparison between the equilibrium in cut-off strategies and an equilibrium in which players swap roles once is depicted in Fig. [4](#Fig4){ref-type="fig"}.[14](#Fn14){ref-type="fn"} Figure [4](#Fig4){ref-type="fig"}a, b depicts the actions of players in the equilibrium in cut-off strategies and the equilibrium in non-cut-off strategies, respectively. These equilibria correspond to the ones depicted in Fig. [4](#Fig4){ref-type="fig"}.Fig. 4Comparison of cut-off equilibrium with equilibrium where players roles once

The thick purple[15](#Fn15){ref-type="fn"}curve ($\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$v_1$$\end{document}$) and the black curve ($\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$v_2$$\end{document}$) in Fig. [4](#Fig4){ref-type="fig"} depict the pay-offs to player 1 and 2, respectively, in the equilibrium in cut-off strategies. In the equilibrium in non-cut-off strategies, pay-offs coincide for beliefs less than or equal to $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$\tilde{p_1}$$\end{document}$. At $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$\tilde{p_1}$$\end{document}$, players switch arms. The thin blue curve depicts the pay-off to player 1, and the thin yellow curve depicts the pay-off to player 2 in the equilibrium in non-cut-off strategies for $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$p>\tilde{p_1}$$\end{document}$. As argued, the blue curve meets the line $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$D_1$$\end{document}$ at a belief $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$p_S^1$$\end{document}$, which is strictly less than $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$p_1^{'}$$\end{document}$. In the region $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$(\tilde{p_1},p_S^1]$$\end{document}$, player 2 experiments and player 1 free rides. At $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$p_s^1$$\end{document}$, player 1 switches to the risky arm and player 2 switches to the safe arm. When the red curve meets the line $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\bar{p}_2$$\end{document}$ is the single person threshold for player 2. This means that, in the equilibrium in non-cut-off strategies, player 2 is forced to act as the lonely pioneer to the left of his single-agent cut-off, which makes his pay-off negatively sloped.[16](#Fn16){ref-type="fn"}
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                \begin{document}$$\lambda _2 > \lambda _2^{*}$$\end{document}$, the equilibrium in cut-off strategies does not exist. However, the argument in the proof of Proposition [7](#FPar17){ref-type="sec"} allows us to show that, on $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$(\bar{p}_1,p_2^{'}]$$\end{document}$, the equilibrium of Proposition [4](#FPar9){ref-type="sec"}, which is the only equilibrium in which player 1 is experimenting throughout this range, strictly welfare dominates all other equilibria. Indeed, with heterogeneous players, more frequent switches have the effect of replacing experimentation by the strong player with experimentation by the weak player in some open subset in $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$(\bar{p}_1, p_2^{'}]$$\end{document}$. Hence, if players switch the role of pioneer and free rider more frequently, the equilibrium welfare is not unambiguously improved. This is in contrast to the case with homogeneous players (Keller et al. [@CR11]), where the only effect of increasing the frequency of switches is to expand the range of beliefs where both players experiment, thus unambiguously speeding up information production and improving equilibrium welfare. Yet, we have not been able to establish that the equilibrium of Proposition [4](#FPar9){ref-type="sec"} is *globally* welfare maximising.

Learning rates versus pay-offs {#Sec10}
------------------------------

In our baseline model, we have considered asymmetric Poisson arrival rates only. However, since the expected lump-sum pay-off from the good risky arm was the same for both players, the asymmetry in learning rates implied that the expected flow pay-off from a good risky arm was also different across the players. In this subsection, we will analyse a model where learning rates differ, but the expected flow pay-off from a good risky arm is the same for both players.
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                \begin{document}$$h_2 > 0$$\end{document}$ such that $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$\lambda _2 h_2 = \hat{g}$$\end{document}$.

We will first analyse the social planner's problem. Please refer to "Appendix (B.10)" for the explicit form of the Bellman equation for the planner's value function *w*. The following proposition will show that the structure of the planner's solution is the same as in Proposition [1](#FPar1){ref-type="sec"}.

### Proposition 8 {#FPar19}
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                \begin{document}$$\begin{aligned} (k_1^{*},k_2^{*}) (p)= \left\{ \begin{array}{lll} (1,1) &{}\quad \text{ if } p \in (\bar{p}_2^{*},1) \\ (1,0) &{}\quad \text{ if } p \in (\bar{p}_1^{*}, \bar{p}_2^{*}] \\ (0,0) &{}\quad \text{ if } p \in (0, \bar{p}_1^{*}] \end{array} \right. \end{aligned}$$\end{document}$$and the value function is$$\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\begin{aligned} w(p) = \left\{ \begin{array}{lll} 2\hat{g}p + \left[ \frac{\lambda }{\lambda _2}s-\hat{g}\bar{p}_2^{*}\frac{1-\lambda _2}{\lambda _2}-2\hat{g}\bar{p}_2^{*}\right] \frac{u_0(p)}{u_0(\bar{p}_2^{*})} &{}\quad \text{ if } p \in (\bar{p}_2^{*},1], \\ s + \left[ \frac{2\hat{g} + r\hat{g}}{1+r} - \frac{s}{1+r}\right] p + \left[ s - \left( \frac{2\hat{g} + r\hat{g}}{1+r} - \frac{s}{ 1+r}\right) \bar{p}_1^{*}\right] \frac{u_1(p)}{u_1(\bar{p}_1^{*})} &{}\quad \text{ if } p \in (\bar{p}_1^{*},\bar{p}_2^{*}], \\ 2s &{}\quad \text{ if } p \in (0,\bar{p}_1^{*}] , \end{array} \right. \end{aligned}$$\end{document}$$where $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$\bar{p}_1^{*}$$\end{document}$ is defined as$$\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$\begin{aligned} \bar{p}_1^{*} = \frac{rs}{2(\hat{g}-s)+ r\hat{g}}, \end{aligned}$$\end{document}$$and $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
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                \begin{document}$$w(\bar{p}_2^{*}) = \frac{\lambda }{\lambda _2} s- \hat{g}\bar{p}_2^{*} \frac{1-\lambda _2}{\lambda _2}$$\end{document}$.

### Proof {#FPar20}

Proof is by a standard verification argument. Please see the "Appendix B.8" for details. $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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We will now analyse the non-cooperative game. Please refer to "Appendix (B.10)" for the explicit form of the Bellman equation player *i*'s ($\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
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                \begin{document}$$\hat{p_1}$$\end{document}$ is the lowest belief where some experimentation takes place and player 1 is the last one to experiment. This implies that, in any equilibrium, for beliefs right above $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\bar{w_2}(\bar{p}_2^{'}) = D_2(\bar{p}_2^{'})$$\end{document}$. In the following proposition, we establish that an equilibrium in cut-off strategies exists if and only if the degree of asymmetry is high enough.

### Proposition 9 {#FPar21}
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### Proof {#FPar22}

Please refer to "Appendix B.9" for details. $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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Figure [5](#Fig5){ref-type="fig"} depicts the equilibrium in cut-off strategies.[18](#Fn18){ref-type="fn"} The black (red) curve depicts the pay-offs to player 1 (2). Since the flow pay-off obtained by each player from a good risky arm is fixed at $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$w = s$$\end{document}$ is the same for both players. As agents become more asymmetric, the best response lines diverge more from each other. Due to this, there emerges a range of beliefs where only player 2 can free ride. Hence, if the degree of asymmetry between the players is high enough, there exists an equilibrium in cut-off strategies.Fig. 5Cut-off equilibrium when only learning rates differ (color figure online)

Using similar arguments, we can establish that when the players' learning rates are equal but their flow pay-offs from a good risky arm are different, an equilibrium in cut-off strategies exists if the asymmetry between the players is high enough. As an illustration, suppose $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$p_2^{'}$$\end{document}$ above. Figure [6](#Fig6){ref-type="fig"}[19](#Fn19){ref-type="fn"} shows an equilibrium in cut-off strategies in this framework. The black (red) curve depicts the pay-offs to player 1 (2). This equilibrium exists only when the players are highly asymmetric, and the best response diagonals are far apart from each other.Fig. 6Cut-off equilibrium when learning rates are equal but risky flow pay-offs differ

In both cases, if it exists, the equilibrium in cut-off strategies is welfare maximising. The argument is similar to above: Player 2 free rides the most in the equilibrium in cut-off strategies, so that the range of beliefs at which both players play risky is largest. In addition, for any equilibrium that is not in cut-off strategies, there is an open set of beliefs in which the roles of experimenting pioneer and free rider are reversed as compared to the equilibrium in cut-off strategies (where only player 2 ever free rides). In the case $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$\lambda _1\not =\lambda _2$$\end{document}$, both effects lead to greater delay in information production in the non-cut-off equilibrium. In the case $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$\lambda _1=\lambda _2=\hat{\lambda }$$\end{document}$, the first effect leads to greater delay, while the second effect leads to a higher opportunity cost of information production ($\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$s-g_1p < s-g_2p$$\end{document}$), in the non-cut-off equilibrium.

Conclusion {#Sec11}
==========

In this paper, we have characterised the set of Markov perfect equilibria in a two-armed bandit model with heterogeneous players. We have shown that there always exists an equilibrium in which the weaker player uses a cut-off strategy. If the heterogeneity is stark enough, there exists an equilibrium in cut-off strategies. If such an equilibrium exists, it is welfare optimal.

Thus, suppose there are two oil companies with vastly different drilling technologies, e.g. a big multinational firm and a small local enterprise. One could argue that the difference in technological capabilities between the two will be bigger in developing countries. On account of the big heterogeneity in capabilities, we should expect the equilibrium in cut-off strategies to exist. An empirically testable prediction of our model would thus be that there will be a higher frequency of instances in developing countries where the small local firm would free ride on the experimentation provided by the big multinational firm, and only enter the market after oil had been struck, even if the original level of uncertainty regarding the presence of oil was only moderate.

We have restricted players to using one arm only at any given instant *t*. By the linearity of the players' Bellman equations, our equilibria would remain equilibria if we allowed players to select experimentation intensities $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$k_{i,t}\in [0,1]$$\end{document}$. There might, however, be more equilibria in this case.

Our analysis has relied heavily on the characterisation of players' best responses via the diagonals $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$D_i$$\end{document}$ \[see Eq. ([4](#Equ4){ref-type=""})\], which was pioneered by Keller et al. ([@CR11]) for the homogeneous-player case. We expect that a similar approach could, *mutatis mutandis*, be used to study other kinds of asymmetries, e.g. pertaining to players' safe-arm pay-offs $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$s_i$$\end{document}$. We should expect a similar result to our Proposition [3](#FPar7){ref-type="sec"} to hold in these cases, namely, that there existed an equilibrium in cut-off strategies if and only if the heterogeneity was stark enough.

Appendix {#Sec12}
========

A Ordinary Differential Equations {#Sec13}
=================================

A.1 ODEs in the planner's problem {#Sec14}
---------------------------------
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                \begin{document}$$\begin{aligned} v(p) = gp + Cu_0(p) \end{aligned}$$\end{document}$$where *C* is a constant of integration.
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                \begin{document}$$\begin{aligned} v(p) = s+ \left[ \frac{g+rg_1}{1+r} - \frac{s}{1+r}\right] p + C u_1(p). \end{aligned}$$\end{document}$$

A.2 ODEs of players in the non-cooperative game {#Sec15}
-----------------------------------------------
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B Proofs {#Sec16}
========

B.1 Proof of Proposition [1](#FPar1){ref-type="sec"} {#Sec17}
----------------------------------------------------
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It remains to show that *v* solves the Bellman equation, i.e. that $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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### Proof {#FPar23}
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B.5 Proof of Proposition [4](#FPar9){ref-type="sec"} {#Sec21}
----------------------------------------------------

If $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$\lambda _2\le \lambda _2^*$$\end{document}$, $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$p_1^{'}\le p_2^{'}$$\end{document}$, by the proof of Proposition [3](#FPar7){ref-type="sec"}. Suppose to the contrary that the equilibrium in which only player 2 uses a cut-off exists. By Proposition [6](#FPar15){ref-type="sec"}, $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$p_S^1<p_1^{'}\le p_2^{'}=p_S^2$$\end{document}$, a contradiction to the characterisation of this equilibrium in Proposition [5](#FPar11){ref-type="sec"}.

Now, suppose $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$\lambda _2>\lambda _2^*$$\end{document}$. By the proof of Proposition [3](#FPar7){ref-type="sec"}, $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$p_1^{'}> p_2^{'}$$\end{document}$. It thus remains to show that $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$\hat{p_S^1}>p_2^{'}$$\end{document}$. Yet, player 1's pay-off from the conjectured equilibrium strategies at $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$p_2^{'}$$\end{document}$ is given by $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$\bar{v}_1(p_2^{'})<D_1(p_2^{'})$$\end{document}$, the inequality being immediately implied by $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$p_1^{'}> p_2^{'}$$\end{document}$, we have $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$\hat{p_S^1}>p_2^{'}$$\end{document}$, and, by Proposition [5](#FPar11){ref-type="sec"}, the equilibrium exists.
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B.8 Proof of Proposition [8](#FPar19){ref-type="sec"} {#Sec24}
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B.9 Proof of Proposition [9](#FPar21){ref-type="sec"} {#Sec25}
-----------------------------------------------------
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B.10 Equations for subsection [4.5](#Sec10){ref-type="sec"} {#Sec26}
-----------------------------------------------------------
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*Planner's problem*

The planner's value function *w* satisfies$$\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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*Non-cooperative game*
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The first paper to do so was Bolton and Harris ([@CR3]). Keller et al. ([@CR11]) have introduced exponential bandits, which we shall use here.

See Hörner and Skrzypacz ([@CR10]) for an overview

Parameter values for this figure: $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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By standard results, on any open interval of beliefs in which player *j*'s action choice is constant, player *i*'s value function $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$v_i$$\end{document}$ will be continuously differentiable. At those (finitely many) beliefs at which player *j*'s action changes, $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$v'$$\end{document}$ should be understood as the left derivative of *v* (since beliefs can only drift down).
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                \begin{document}$$i=1,2$$\end{document}$).

Parameter Values: $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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These pay-offs are obtained from [12](#Equ12){ref-type=""} by imposing the condition $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$i = 1,2$$\end{document}$).

All our figures correspond to parametric values such that the point of intersection of $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$p_2^{'}$$\end{document}$. All of our analysis goes through unchanged for this case as well.
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For the particular parameter values used in Fig. [3](#Fig3){ref-type="fig"}, we have $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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For the particular parameter values used in Fig. [3](#Fig3){ref-type="fig"}, we have $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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Dong ([@CR6]) shows that if the players' initial beliefs are asymmetric enough, equilibrium welfare improves.

Proposition [6](#FPar15){ref-type="sec"} implies that the qualitative characteristics of $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$p_s^2$$\end{document}$ are the same in any equilibrium in non-cut-off strategies. For simplicity, we consider an equilibrium in non-cut-off strategies where players swap roles only once in the figure.
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Mathematically, this can be seen as follows: consider a function $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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Please refer to "Appendix (B.10)" for explicit expressions for these functions.
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We suppress arguments whenever this is convenient.

In "Appendix A.1", we display the ODEs that *v* satisfies for each range of beliefs and the corresponding general form of *v* for that range. The specific value of *v* is obtained by value matching.

As in "Appendix A.1", from [17](#Equ17){ref-type=""} we can obtain the ODEs that *w* satisfies for each range of beliefs and the corresponding general form of *w* for that range.
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